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The diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder has been criticized on numerous grounds, but principally for three
reasons (a) the alleged pathologizing of normal events, (b) the inadequacy of Criterion A, and (c) symptom overlap
with other disorders. The authors review these problems along with arguments why the diagnosis is nevertheless
worth retaining in an amended form. A proposal for the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) is put forward that involves abolishing Criterion A, narrowing the B criteria to
focus on the core phenomena of flashbacks and nightmares, and narrowing the C and D criteria to reduce overlap
with other disorders. The potential advantages and disadvantages of this formulation are discussed.
Despite an enormous increase in knowledge about psycholog-
ical trauma over the last 30 years, the diagnosis of posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) continues to attract controversy. An ex-
treme view, for example, is that it is a “faddish postulate” that
has “moved the mental health field away from, not toward, un-
derstanding the psychological responses to trauma” (McHugh &
Treisman, 2007, p. 221). In this review we evaluate some of the
criticisms of PTSD and conclude that it is nevertheless a valuable
diagnosis that is worth retaining. Finally, we outline the possible
advantages of abolishing PTSD Criterion A while simultaneously
making the B–D criteria more explicit and more stringent.
Posttraumatic stress disorder was introduced in the third edi-
tion of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1980) as a
“monocausal” mental disorder requiring a recognizable stressor
“that would evoke significant symptoms of distress in almost ev-
eryone” and that was “generally outside the range of usual human
experience.” The stressor criterion (Criterion A) was subsequently
elaborated in DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) to give examples of qualify-
ing events (e.g., serious threat to life or physical integrity). A major
justification for PTSD was the previous assumption that stressful
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events could only produce transitory mental disturbance, meaning
that there was no diagnosis available for individuals who developed
long-lasting psychopathology in response to extreme stress.
This idea of a disorder that could be explained entirely by an
environmental event rather than by the characteristics of a person,
or their interaction, was in marked contrast to other disorders in
the DSM and was immediately controversial. It soon became clear,
however, that traumatic events were much more prevalent than
had been assumed, and that typically only a minority of individuals
developed PTSD afterwards, facts that fundamentally challenged
the conceptual basis of the disorder (Yehuda & McFarlane, 1995).
After almost three decades of research we know that although the
nature of the stressor and its intensity is important, PTSD has a
multifactorial etiology (Brewin, Andrews, & Valentine, 2000).
E V A L U A T I O N O F T H R E E C R I T I C I S M S O F P T S D
Criticism 1: PTSD Pathologizes Normal Distress
One repeated criticism of PTSD has been that it creates a medical
condition out of normal distress (McHugh & Treisman, 2007;
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Summerfield, 2001). This is a complex claim and can be taken in
at least three different ways. One is that reactions to extreme
stress are time-limited, and that PTSD symptoms will resolve
naturally of their own accord with no lasting harm to the person.
Another possible meaning of the claim is that the “symptoms” of
PTSD are ubiquitous reactions to stressful events found in people
suffering from normal distress. A final meaning is that PTSD is
not biologically distinguishable from normal distress.
The claim that reactions to extreme stress are time-limited, and
that PTSD symptoms will resolve naturally of their own accord
with no lasting harm to the person was the received view prior
to DSM-III. Epidemiological studies refute these assertions, and
show that extreme stress sometimes leads to severe and long-lasting
psychopathology (e.g., Norris & Slone, 2007), as well as to a va-
riety of serious medical conditions (Schnurr & Green, 2004). A
follow-up of children who were aged 4 to 11 when they survived
the Aberfan disaster in 1966 showed that one third still suffered
from PTSD 33 years later (Morgan, Scourfield, Williams, Jasper,
& Lewis, 2003). Studies of terrorist attacks similarly distinguish
between largely short-term symptomatic reactions in the popula-
tion who are not directly involved versus long-term disorder in
direct victims (Neria, Nandi, & Galea, 2008; Whalley & Brewin,
2007).
A popular view currently is that PTSD reflects a failure of
adaptation, whereby normal reactions to extreme stress do not
correct themselves (e.g., Brewin, 2003; Shalev, 2003). Thus, what
is pathological about PTSD is defined not by the nature but by the
persistence of its symptoms. Critics who claim PTSD is nothing
but normal distress should be obliged to state how long symptoms
can last or how much impairment can be tolerated before it is
unreasonable still to regard them as “normal.” This they have yet
to do.
Increasing evidence also supports a distinctive biological profile
associated with PTSD. A recent meta-analysis examined functional
neuroimaging of emotion processing in several anxiety disorders
and identified unique patterns of activation in PTSD compared to
social anxiety disorder and specific phobia (Etkin & Wager, 2007).
Other studies have found distinct patterns of neural activation in
PTSD patients as compared to depressed patients (Whalley, Rugg,
Smith, Dolan, & Brewin, 2009), and in PTSD patients with and
without comorbid depression (Kemp et al., 2007; Lanius et al.,
2007). There is also evidence suggesting distinctive patterns of
cortisol negative feedback inhibition in PTSD versus depression
(Yehuda, Halligan, Golier, Grossman, & Bierer, 2004).
Criticism 2: Inadequacy of Criterion A
Much of the criticism directed at PTSD has focused on the A
criterion. In their review, Weathers and Keane (2007) identified
three fundamental issues: How broadly or narrowly should trauma
be defined? Can trauma be measured reliably and validly? What
is the relationship between trauma and PTSD? In this article we
focus primarily on their first and last questions, reviewing evidence
that trauma is not exclusively associated with PTSD, that Criterion
A is insufficiently specific (i.e., too broad), and conversely that it
is excessively specific (i.e., too narrow).
Other disorders are linked to traumatic (Criterion A) events.
The existence of the stressor criterion implies a unique relation-
ship between trauma and PTSD. In fact, trauma is associated with
an increased prevalence of other disorders, most commonly de-
pression, generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), panic disorder, and
increased substance use (Fullerton & Ursano, 2005). There may
also be adjustment disorders, agoraphobia, and specific phobias
related to the type of incident (e.g., Handley, Salkovskis, Scragg,
& Ehlers, in press; Gabriel et al., 2007). If other disorders can be
successfully diagnosed after a traumatic event, the question arises
why the same could not be true of PTSD.
Although disorders other than PTSD are linked to Criterion
A events, there is considerable evidence that these events do not
increase the risk for other disorders independently of the increased
risk for PTSD. For example, Breslau, Davis, Peterson, and Schultz
(2000) showed that that there was an increased risk for depression
in respondents who had also developed PTSD, but no increased
risk in respondents who were exposed to trauma without develop-
ing PTSD. As noted by Breslau et al., similar findings have been
obtained for substance use and anxiety disorders, suggesting that
PTSD does indeed play a central role in the psychological response
to trauma.
Insufficient specificity of Criterion A. The original conceptu-
alization of PTSD as a response to an event “generally outside the
range of usual human experience” was broadened when it was re-
alized that the prevalence of traumatic events was higher than had
been supposed. In the DSM-IV the definition of a traumatic stres-
sor was further broadened in that a person who is not personally
and directly exposed to trauma but rather learns about someone
else being traumatized now qualifies as having been exposed to
trauma. As a result, critics have charged that there is a kind of
“conceptual bracket creep” (McNally, 2003) or “criterion creep”
(Rosen, 2004) that is causing PTSD to be diagnosed in response
to situations that are far removed from the original concept of a
trauma.
Among the non-Criterion A events that have been reported
to produce PTSD symptoms are marital disruption, affairs, and
divorce; collapse of adoption arrangements; employment-related
stressors and money problems; bereavement; loss of cattle to foot
and mouth disease; frightening Halloween television programs;
and breaking up with a best friend (Rosen & Lilienfeld, 2008).
A close inspection of the literature, however, shows very few ex-
amples of individuals meeting the full diagnostic criteria in these
circumstances. Most of the authors cited turn out either to have
only expressed their own opinions, or have only collected data
on a subset of PTSD symptoms rather than use a proper clinical
interview, or are based on samples of children.
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Breslau and Kessler (2001) found that the broadening of the
stressor criterion in DSM-IV did lead to more cases of PTSD,
but that most were attributable to learning about the sudden un-
expected death of a close relative or friend, an event that could
quite reasonably be described as traumatic. Other situations where
events not clearly meeting the Criterion A threshold are some-
times associated with full PTSD involve a build-up of stress over a
prolonged period. Examples given in the literature include harass-
ment at work, caring for a terminally ill partner, or stalking (Pathe
& Mullen, 1997; Scott & Stradling, 1994). Prolonged duration
stress leading to PTSD has also been described in military samples
(Breslau & Davis, 1987).
Several articles in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks documented PTSD symptoms not only among
residents of affected areas (e.g., Galea et al., 2002), but among
persons living in geographically distant parts of the United States
(e.g., Silver et al., 2002). McNally and Breslau (2008) referred
to these psychological responses as “virtual PTSD” and suggested
that they were “normal, temporary distress responses to a shocking
event, not medical symptoms indicative of psychiatric illness.”
Marshall, Amsel, and Suh (2008) responded by pointing out that
2 years later persons with acute stress symptoms after 9/11 had
almost double the rate of new-onset hypertension and more than
triple the rate of new-onset heart problems. Moreover, persons
with ongoing terrorism-related worries had more than a 4.5-fold
increase in new-onset heart problems (Holman et al., 2008).
Marshall et al. (2008) also emphasized that trauma of lower in-
tensity would in fact be expected to provoke PTSD in vulnerable
individuals with a limited capacity to dampen their physiologi-
cal response to stress. Such vulnerability may be genetic (Hariri
et al., 2002), interacting with lifetime exposure to trauma (Stein,
Schork, & Gelernter, 2008), or epigenetic (Yehuda, Bell, Bierer,
& Schmeidler, 2008). Vulnerability may also be related to greater
levels of prior trauma (Williams et al., 2007). Both subjective dis-
tress and complexity of symptoms, including comorbidity, may
be considered as separate indicators of vulnerability to trauma
and stress (Novac & Hubert-Schneider, 1998). Thus, the fact that
some events associated with PTSD may appear “insufficient” for
Criterion A is only surprising if, as in DSM-IV, no allowance is
made for variability in enduring stress reactivity.
Excessive specificity of Criterion A. In 1994, DSM-IV intro-
duced a two-part stressor criterion for adults (the criteria for chil-
dren are slightly different). To qualify for a PTSD diagnosis, in-
dividuals had not only to have experienced, witnessed, or been
confronted with a qualifying event (Criterion A1), but to have re-
sponded with intense fear, helplessness, or horror (Criterion A2).
This subjective element to the trauma response was introduced de-
spite evidence from the DSM-IV Field Trial (Kilpatrick et al., 1998)
that there are a wide range of reactions to trauma associated with
PTSD, including shame, a sense of violation of trust, emotional
numbing, etc. Consistent with their findings, other studies have
identified cases in which trauma exposure is not accompanied by
A2 responses although the full PTSD syndrome develops. For
example, military personnel are trained to deal with traumatic sit-
uations, and report A2 responses less often (Adler, Wright, Bliese,
Eckford, & Hoge, 2008; Breslau & Kessler, 2001). Among civilian
victims of violent crime a small number had sufficient symptoms
for PTSD in the absence of Criterion A2; they reported other in-
tense emotions such as shame or anger instead (Brewin, Andrews,
& Rose, 2000). Survivors with traumatic brain injury may also go
on to develop PTSD despite losing consciousness and being unable
to report A2 responses (Harvey, Kopelman, & Brewin, 2005).
The fact that some individuals develop the complete syndrome
without describing intense fear, helplessness, or horror at the time
of the trauma is only surprising if, as in DSM-IV, it is assumed
that the original emotions remain stable over time. Psychological
and biological knowledge are, however, more consistent with the
idea that memories, and the emotions associated with them, can
and do sometimes change (Brewin, 2003; McNally, 2003).
Criticism 3: Symptom Overlap with Other Disorders
The symptom overlap with depression and other anxiety disor-
ders has been frequently noted as a potential problem with the
PTSD diagnosis (e.g., Brewin, 2003; McHugh & Treisman, 2007;
Spitzer, First, & Wakefield, 2007). Symptom B1 refers to any kind
of intrusive memory, image, or thought, a symptom that is com-
mon to many psychiatric disorders. Patients who ruminate in the
absence of any intrusive memory would therefore currently qual-
ify for Criterion B, even though most clinicians would regard this
as more characteristic of depression than PTSD. Emotional and
physiological arousal elicited by specific situations, and avoidance
of those situations, are part of phobias. Phobic patients would meet
Criterion B by virtue of endorsing B4 and B5, without any of the
reexperiencing normally associated with PTSD. Social withdrawal,
loss of interest, emotional numbing, and hopelessness about the
future are all common features of depression. Sleeplessness, irri-
tability, and concentration problems are found in both depression
and in generalized anxiety disorder, which can also be accompa-
nied by exaggerated startle. This lack of specificity is of particular
concern because there are so many different combinations of symp-
toms that will all yield a diagnosis of PTSD.
A confirmatory factor analysis by Simms, Watson, and
Doebbeling (2002) found that PTSD symptoms fell into reex-
periencing, avoidance, dysphoria, and hyperarousal clusters. Al-
though one other 4-factor solution provides a good fit to the data,
Simms et al.’s model has received most support to date (Palmieri,
Weathers, Difede, & King, 2007). Simms et al. found that the
symptoms that overlap most with depression (C4–C7 and D1–
D3) did indeed reflect a general dysphoria factor rather than being
specific to PTSD. Breslau and Kessler (2001) found that the in-
crease in PTSD rates attributable to the broadening of Criterion
A1 in DSM-IV occurred mainly because of events consisting of
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learning of unexpected injury to or the death of a close friend or
loved one. These events are as likely to have induced sadness and
grief as fear or horror. It is possible therefore that it is related condi-
tions such as depression, also characterized by intrusive memories
and general symptoms of dysphoria, that account for the apparent
increase in PTSD rates that has been reported with the broadening
of Criterion A1.
Two reexperiencing symptoms that do appear to be distinctive
to PTSD are flashbacks and traumatic nightmares. Clinical de-
scriptions of PTSD emphasize the importance of flashbacks, pow-
erful multisensory image-based memories triggered by reminders
in which traumatic events are reexperienced in the present rather
than in the past (Brewin, 2003; Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael,
2004). In flashbacks the recall of traumatic images appears to
be disconnected from contextual information that normally asso-
ciates a sensory memory with awareness of a corresponding time
and place. They can vary from relatively mild (there is a transient
sense of the event reoccurring in the present) to extreme (the per-
son loses all connection with their current autobiographical self
and present surroundings while reexperiencing the memory). An
emerging literature documents that flashbacks are specific to PTSD
rather than mere trauma exposure (Brewin, 2007), that they distin-
guish PTSD from depression (Reynolds & Brewin, 1998) and that,
relative to intrusive memories in depression, intrusive memories
in PTSD involve a greater sense of reliving in the present (Birrer
et al., 2007). Flashbacks appear to be a particularly sensitive and
specific indicator of PTSD (Duke, Allen, Rozee, & Bommaritto,
2008), and their characteristic features are predictive of the course
of the disorder (Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005).
Posttraumatic nightmares are another common distinctive fea-
ture of PTSD, occurring in up to 70% of sufferers (Harvey,
Jones, & Schmidt, 2003; Lamarche & De Koninck, 2007). Al-
though other anxiety disorders are associated with sleep distur-
bance, they differ in their specific phenomenological characteris-
tics (e.g., Sheikh, Woodward, & Leskin, 2003). It is of interest
that a similar intervention, imagery rehearsal and rescripting, has
been used specifically to treat nightmares as well as to treat PTSD
symptoms more generally (Lamarche & De Koninck, 2007).
I M P R O V I N G T H E D I A G N O S I S O F P T S D
We propose that the way forward for the PTSD diagnosis is to
abolish Criterion A and refocus PTSD around a smaller set of
core symptoms. First, why abolish Criterion A? Previously in this
article we have described the criticisms PTSD has faced for includ-
ing etiology in its criteria, and the practical difficulties in defining
Criterion A in such a way as to include all relevant cases but ex-
clude inappropriate ones. Criterion A has now gone through three
iterations, and we regard it as highly unlikely that any formulation
for Criterion A will be found that deals with all the problems and
inconsistencies that have been identified. Moreover, the evidence
we have reviewed on individual differences in sensitization and
vulnerability clearly suggest that specifying triggering events is not
just difficult, but undesirable. An individual’s symptomatic profile
will always be shaped by their genetics, by their environmental
history, and by the interaction of the two. To imagine that a sin-
gle triggering event will always outweigh these runs contrary to
contemporary thinking.
Criterion A could be weakened until any event would qualify,
as is the case for adjustment disorder. Like some previous authors,
however, we think the criterion would be better dispensed with
altogether. Solomon and Canino (1990) pointed out that keep-
ing the stressor as part of the diagnosis builds in a confound that
makes it impossible to assess empirically to what class of stres-
sor the symptomatic response of PTSD occurs. In the DSM-IV
Field Trial (Kilpatrick et al., 1998), altering the definition of
Criterion A (including allowing low-magnitude events to qual-
ify as triggers for PTSD) had virtually no impact on prevalence
rates. In a study of tourists affected by the tsunami of December
26, 2004, the value of Criterion A to predict PTSD Criteria B–D
was low so that, based on these findings, the authors regarded Cri-
terion A as dispensable (Kraemer, Wittmann, Jenewein, Maier, &
Schnyder, 2009; see also Bedard-Gilligan & Zoellner, 2008). The
data we have reviewed in this article are consistent in demonstrating
that, with the exception of some cases arising from stress of pro-
longed duration, the full PTSD syndrome hardly ever occurs in the
absence of an event that could reasonably be described as traumatic:
In other words, Criterion A simply describes the usual context of
PTSD without contributing itself to diagnostic precision.
If Criterion A does not assist in making a diagnosis, and
the attempt to define it simply creates controversy, it is hard to
argue that it is worth retaining. Like Maier (2006), we believe that
the information provided by Criterion A can be substituted by
the presence or absence of a set of core symptoms, and that it is
possible to omit Criterion A without any loss of accuracy, selec-
tivity, or validity of the diagnosis of PTSD. Why is this desirable?
First, as reviewed above, there is abundant evidence that existing
symptoms in clusters B–D are commonly reported in response to
a wide variety of stressful situations, whether traumatic or not.
It is also striking that other anxiety disorders (e.g., social anxiety,
panic disorder, OCD) have far simpler diagnostic criteria and gen-
erally contain a core defining feature that can be recognized with
a high degree of reliability. It is an empirical question whether
PTSD could be similarly simplified. Consistent with this possibil-
ity, however, there is evidence that screening measures with as few
as 4 to 6 items perform as well as longer instruments containing
the full 17 items specified in DSM-IV in detecting current PTSD
(Brewin, 2005).
Our proposal is that PTSD should be refocused around the
core phenomenon of reexperiencing in the present, in the form
of intrusive multisensory images accompanied by marked fear or
horror, an event now perceived as having severely threatened a
person’s physical or psychological well-being. The intention is to
highlight the features that are most salient to the individual with
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PTSD, that are the primary focus of psychological treatment, and
that make PTSD distinct from other anxiety disorders and from
depression. Images may be visual, auditory, olfactory, somatosen-
sory, or a combination of these. The reexperiencing symptoms
need to be supplemented by other, closely related symptoms that
are as far as possible specific to PTSD and are less likely to reflect
general dysphoria. Thus, the current diagnostic criteria could be
amended to read as shown in Table 1, involving a reduction from
17 to 6 core symptoms. Five of these six symptoms were found to
be among the most highly predictive of a PTSD diagnosis in the
DSM-IV Field Trial (Kilpatrick et al., 1998).
These criteria emphasize once more the actual symptoms cur-
rently reported by patients rather than their accounts of past events,
recognizing that the significance of those events may be changed
by subsequent psychological and biological developments. There
is an explicit focus on the emotions of fear and horror, recogniz-
ing that there are related but probably distinct disorders in which
intrusive memories and images are accompanied by other emo-
tions such as anger, guilt, shame, or sadness, but not by fear or
horror. Finally, it is important to emphasize that, like many other
disorders, PTSD is unlikely to occur in isolation and will typically
Table 1. Proposed Diagnostic Criteria for Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-V )
Criterion B (Reexperiencing—should be present in past month or,
exceptionally, on examination). Either:
(i) recurrent distressing dreams related to an event now
perceived as having severely threatened someone’s physical
or psychological well-being, from which the person wakes
with marked fear or horror, or
(ii) repeated daytime images related to an event now perceived
as having severely threatened someone’s physical or
psychological wellbeing, experienced as recurring in the
present and accompanied by marked fear or horror
Criterion C (Avoidance—should be present in past month).
Either:
(i) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, conversations, or internal
reminders associated with the reexperienced event(s), or
(ii) efforts to avoid activities, places, people, or external
reminders associated with the reexperienced event(s)
Criterion D (Hyperarousal—should be present most days in past
month). Either:
(i) hypervigilance, or
(ii) exaggerated startle response
Criterion E (Duration): Duration of the disturbance is more
than 1 month.
Criterion F (Impairment): The disturbance causes clinically
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or
other important areas of functioning.
be comorbid with depression, substance abuse, anxiety disorders,
more complex dissociative presentations, etc.
P O T E N T I A L A D V A N T A G E S A N D D I S A D V A N T A G E S
O F T H E P R O P O S E D D I A G N O S T I C C R I T E R I A
Abolition of Criterion A
Among the possible advantages of not requiring a trauma is that
PTSD will immediately come into alignment with all other psy-
chiatric disorders, and one major source of controversy will have
been eliminated. Posttraumatic stress disorder will now be much
more comparable with the other anxiety disorders and with de-
pression. There will no longer be a problem deciding whether the
reexperienced event qualifies for Criterion A, or depending on ret-
rospective reports of what emotions were felt, and how strongly,
many months or years previously. Individual vulnerability, profes-
sional training to face traumatic events, and changing perceptions
of events over time, will no longer disqualify individuals from be-
ing diagnosed with PTSD. Clinicians will be free to focus on the
symptomatic presentation and on the most appropriate treatment,
free of concerns that someone will decide that a survivor of trauma
“could not have PTSD” because the events lived through were not
on a list established by a limited number of studies, or because the
“right” emotions were not felt at the time. Any risk of a return
to the pre-DSM-III state of affairs when the treatment needs of
individuals with PTSD were not recognized would be minimized.
Two objections to abolishing Criterion A were recently articu-
lated by Weathers and Keane (2007). One was that it would result
in a substantial departure from the original conceptualization of
PTSD. In our view that conceptualization should now change sub-
stantially to reflect the wealth of new research findings on risk
factors, traumatic memory, etc. It has become clear that a trau-
matic event does not have the etiological status that was originally
envisaged, but that it interacts in a complex way with the individ-
ual characteristics of the affected person. Their second objection
was that it would risk trivializing the suffering of those exposed to
catastrophic life events. We believe that, unlike in 1980, it is now
clearly established that traumatic events can have a severe and long-
lasting impact on mental health. We anticipate that meeting the
new criteria for PTSD will continue to be very strongly associated
with exposure to events meeting the former Criterion A, and that
these events will continue to be identifiable through the content of
the reexperiencing symptoms. Our concern is rather that having
the etiological criterion places excessive emphasis on PTSD as the
primary outcome of catastrophic events and impedes recognition
of other common outcomes such as depression, phobia, GAD,
somatoform disorders, substance abuse disorders, etc.
Another potential objection is that without the gatekeeper func-
tion of Criterion A the scope of PTSD will be widened to include
reactions to almost any stressor, and that the diagnosis will become
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meaningless as a result. We believe the existing data suggest this is
unlikely to occur, and that in any case the accompanying increased
focus on core symptoms, together with the impairment criterion,
will prevent this from happening.
Focusing on Core Symptoms
The increased focus on a core disturbance, and the consequent
simplification of the criteria, should lead to improved ease of iden-
tification and diagnosis in settings other than specialist trauma
centers. The removal of symptoms associated with general dys-
phoria should also lead to greater homogeneity of cases and re-
duced overlap with other disorders. In keeping with the emphasis
on the underlying psychological process, the criteria additionally
give clinicians greater flexibility in identifying reexperiencing on
examination. Highly avoidant patients may not have had reexperi-
encing symptoms in the past month even though they know what
situations continue to trigger them and the symptoms are read-
ily apparent when they describe their trauma. Finally, the explicit
focus on the reexperiencing of fear and horror should encourage
better links with basic psychological and neuroscience approaches
to these emotions.
One disadvantage of the proposals is that there may be dis-
agreement about what constitutes the core of the disorder. North,
Suris, Davis, and Smith (2009) have recently proposed that the
defining features of PTSD are the avoidance and numbing symp-
toms, partly on the grounds that this symptom cluster is less com-
monly endorsed than the others, and that meeting the threshold
for these symptoms is more predictive of subsequent disorder than
meeting criteria for the reexperiencing or hyperarousal symptoms.
However, much of the evidence on which this argument is based
does not distinguish clearly between effortful avoidance and emo-
tional numbing, which appear to be distinct dimensions with dif-
ferent underlying mechanisms (e.g., Elklit & Shevlin, 2007; Foa,
Zinbarg, & Rothbaum, 1992; Simms et al., 2002). It is important
both practically and theoretically to know whether it is numbing,
avoidance, or both that account for the predictive power of this
symptom cluster. Another problem is that the numbing symptoms
are those that overlap most with depression (Simms et al., 2002),
rather than being a distinctive characteristic of PTSD.
C O N C L U S I O N
The controversy over the PTSD diagnosis and the uncertainty over
how to frame Criterion A have not abated with the passage of time
or with increasing knowledge. Critics of PTSD have frequently had
valid points to make, but have less often made constructive sug-
gestions for its improvement. We believe the value of the diagnosis
itself is clear, but that its dependence on the etiological criterion is
now more of historical interest rather than practical importance.
Further, the symptomatic overlap with other disorders has tended
to impede research into underlying processes, and to obscure links
with the psychology and biology of emotion. It may also have
given a false impression of the degree of comorbidity associated
with the disorder. We believe that PTSD has now come of age in
the sense of being accepted as a distinct and important condition
with its own range of evidence-based, targeted treatments. In our
view it is time to consider a reformulation of the diagnosis built
on the formidable knowledge base that has accrued in the last
30 years.
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